We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller o¤ers di¤erent price-quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information.
I. Introduction
Firms often make it inconvenient for consumers to purchase their products. Coupons, for example, require consumers to bear hassle costs of coupon redemption.
1 Setting up factory outlets is another popular way to price-discriminate. Outlet stores o¤er signi…cant discounts for consumers who are willing to travel and bear waiting time.
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In these examples, a common observation is that the consumers with lower valuation incur additional transaction costs -clipping coupons and traveling to factory outlet stores. The low-valuation consumers pay a lower price, but they must incur a transaction cost, which in turn discourages the high-valuation consumers from taking advantage of discounted prices. The underlying assumption behind this price discrimination mechanism is that the low-valuation consumers are assumed to have a lower opportunity cost of time for clipping, waiting and traveling.
Following the previous contributions, this paper also analyzes transaction costs and price discrimination. In our model, however, a costly e¤ort increases the likelihood of transaction, and the seller can make a transaction e¤ort himself, or let the consumers make such an e¤ort. We refer to the former strategy as "marketing"and the latter strategy as "demarketing." We demonstrate that it can be optimal for the seller to engage in demarketing, and in such a case, the seller induces only the high-valuation consumers to exert a transaction e¤ort, thus decreasing the sales opportunity for the low-valuation consumers. This result is in stark contrast to the previous studies mentioned above where only the low-valuation consumers are making a transaction e¤ort.
There are many cases where the seller chooses between marketing and demarketing. For example, a …rm can choose whether or not to have sales associates in a showroom. Sales associates foster buyer awareness of the …rm's products, help buyers learn about the products, and convince them to consider the products. For skill-based products such as complex consumer electronics and computer software, an expert salesperson often helps consumers to realize how they can utilize a product. Similarly, the …rm may operate help-centers to teach product features to consumers or o¤er free trials of the products. These are the seller's transaction e¤orts (marketing) to increase the likelihood of a transaction.
When the seller does not make such e¤orts (demarketing), consumers may have to exert a cognitive e¤ort to be aware of the product, or an information gathering e¤ort to learn the product features and functionalities. Some demarketing also include reducing the number of stores, business hours, and useful features of the product, thus making the buyer incur extra costs for transactions.
Again, to alleviate the friction in a transaction, an e¤ort is made by either the seller or the consumer.
We investigate why a seller discourages buyers from purchasing a product/service, by transferring transaction costs to them. We adopt a monopoly framework with second-degree price discrimination.
Unlike the traditional setup, in our model, the probability of a transaction rises when a transaction cost is incurred. Under full information, marketing and demarketing give the same optimal outcome 1 See, for example, Narasimhan [1984] and Gerstner and Holthausen [1986] . 2 See Nocke et al. [2011] for example.
2 since the seller can adjust the product's price level depending on which party bears the cost of transaction. When the buyers are privately informed about their valuation (type), the answer is not straightforward.
To preview our result, with marketing, the seller must exert a transaction e¤ort independent of the consumer type. With demarketing, however, a transaction e¤ort is made depending on a consumer's type, which involves loss of sales opportunity, but allows the seller to price-discriminate more e¤ectively. As a result, demarketing can dominate marketing. The key trade-o¤ in our paper is "sales opportunity vs. surplus extraction."
The intuition behind our result is as follows. If the seller engages in marketing, the situation becomes the standard screening problem. As usual in models of this type, a high-valuation (hightype) consumer has an incentive to misrepresent her type to reap consumer surplus. To mitigate such incentive, the optimal product quality for the low-type consumer is distorted downward. With demarketing, the seller has to compensate consumers for the transaction cost through the product's price. We show that the seller induces only the high-type consumers to make a transaction e¤ort.
Because the low-type consumers are not compensated for transaction e¤orts, the high-type consumers are discouraged from mimicking the low-type consumers. As a result, a demarketing strategy allows the seller to recover the distortion in the product quality for the low-type consumers.
We show that the seller particularly prefers demarketing to marketing when the transaction cost is intermediate because the high-type consumer's mimicking incentive diminishes substantially. On the other hand, for small and large transaction costs, the seller prefers marketing to demarketing.
When the transaction cost is small, the seller's compensation is not attractive enough to signi…-cantly mitigate the high-type consumers'mimicking incentive. When the transaction cost is large, the compensation is so large that the reverse incentive problem becomes an issue -the low-type consumers have an incentive to mimic the high-type consumers in such a case.
We extend the analysis in two ways. First, we further study the case where the seller can choose how to allocate a share of transaction cost between himself and consumers, and demonstrate that our main result is robust to this extension. In particular, when the proportion of the high-type consumers is large enough, the seller will not allocate any transaction e¤ort to himself.
Second, we consider the case where the seller can choose a more re…ned strategy by o¤ering special discounts or deals -the price-quality bundle for the high-type consumers is available only through an exclusive channel, which requires high-type consumers to make a transaction e¤ort for the high quality product. For example, some retailers o¤er special deals or sales through e-mails only when consumers submit a long survey. As mentioned above, under the demarketing strategy, if the cost of transaction e¤ort is su¢ ciently large, the price-discount for the high-type consumers must also be large. This induces the low-type consumers to choose the product for the high-type consumers without making a transaction e¤ort. Such incentive, however, is mitigated by exclusive channels that require a transaction e¤ort for the high quality product. We show that demarketing with this exclusive channel strategy dominates marketing for large transaction costs. Following Kotler and Levy [1971] who …rst discussed demarketing activities, there are several theoretical perspectives to account for demarketing. Narasimhan [1984] and Gerstner and Holthausen [1986] study price discriminating demarketing. Transaction costs, such as an opportunity cost to clip coupons, are deliberately created by …rms as a tool for screening consumers. 3 When consumers with a high (low) value for the product also have high (low) transaction costs, o¤ering coupons or making purchasing more di¢ cult can be a pro…table price discrimination strategy. This correlation is appropriate when high valuation types have higher incomes, but if instead high valuation types are just more interested in the product then this assumption need not hold. To capture this latter case, in our model we assume a consumer's valuation of the product is independent of her cost of transaction e¤ort. In addition, in these studies a product is not directly di¤erentiated in quality. In our model, the seller o¤ers di¤erent price-quality bundles as a screening device. Our point in this paper is that a distortion in quality o¤ered can be lessened when the seller adopts a demarketing strategy.
Related Literature
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There are also papers that investigate a signaling e¤ect of demarketing. Feltovich et al. [2002] show that high quality senders choose not to send signals when there exists noisy exogenous information about type. Zhao [2000] , Bagwell and Overgaard [2006] , Mayzlin and Shin [2011] and Suzuki [2014] show that a high quality producer can distinguish itself from a low quality producer by lowering awareness or spending less on advertising. In particular, Miklós-Thal and Zhang [2013] consider a situation in which sophisticated consumers attribute a product's market performance to product quality and marketing e¤orts as well. In their model, demarketing can improve quality image ex post by highlighting high quality when sales are good and by mitigating quality concerns when sales are bad. 5 In addition, Gerstner et al. [1993] study demarketing as a di¤erentiation from rival …rms to avoid a price war. There are also papers providing behavioral explanations. For example, Kopalle and Lehmann [2006] argue that sellers may understate quality deliberately to give a pleasant surprise to consumers.
The current paper employs second degree price discrimination in the monopoly framework pioneered by Mussa and Rosen [1978] and Maskin and Riley [1984] . Using that framework, numerous papers study situations in which marketing or advertising makes price discrimination more profitable to the seller. The literature includes Lewis and Sappington [1994] , Ottaviani and Prat [2001] , Courty and Li [2001] , and more recently, Grubb [2009] and Nocke et al. [2011] .
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Unlike these 3 There are other papers that study a setting where consumers have to incur some costs. Wernerfelt [1994] compares several di¤erent selling formats when buyers incur transaction costs, and Wernerfelt [1996] considers …rms being able to increase e¢ ciency by sharing the costs with buyers. 4 Deneckere and McAfee [1996] provides explanations for "damaged goods" using the downward quality distortion in the second degree price discrimination, which can be interpreted as a type of demarketing. Again, in our paper, demarketing allows the seller to price-discriminate better, which in turn, recovers the downward distortion in quality. 5 In the signaling explanation of demarketing, most studies deliberately assume costless marketing. Thus, costless marketing makes demarketing costly in the sense that demarketing has to give up the opportunity of using costless marketing activities. This is the reason demarketing incurs a transaction cost which may have a signaling power.
However, marketing is costly in our model, and demarketing is the decision to transfer the cost to the consumer. 6 Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat [2010] considers a monopolist who does not price discriminate, but imposes costs 4 papers, we consider the situation where costly e¤ort can reduce some friction in the sales process.
Also, in our paper, the party that directly incurs the e¤ort cost is endogenously determined.
In addition, our paper is connected to studies on "countervailing incentives", which means that consumers may have incentives to overstate their preference in our context. In their seminal work in a principal-agent framework, Lewis and Sappington [1989] show that the presence of countervailing incentives improves the principal's welfare. Jullien [2000] provides a general analysis of typedependent participation constraints with a continuum of types. The optimal mechanism with countervailing incentives and its bene…t is applied in our paper. We show that inducing consumers to incur the e¤ort cost generates countervailing incentives, which helps the seller extract the consumer's information rent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide a simple example that illustrates our point. In Section 4, the seller's optimal outcome with marketing is discussed, followed by the seller's optimal outcome with demarketing in Section 5. In Section 6, we endogenize the seller's choice between marketing and demarketing. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller and the consumer can share a transaction e¤ort in Section 7. In this section, we also study the case where the seller o¤ers special deals through exclusive channels. We conclude in Section 8. All proofs are in the Appendix.
II. Model
Seller and Buyer We present a monopoly model with second degree price discrimination. The intensity of consumer's preference toward the product is denoted by i 2 fH; Lg; where H (L) represents high (low) valuation, and H L > 0: With a probability ' i ; the consumer is type-i and ' H + ' L = 1: The population of consumers, for simplicity, is normalized to one. The consumer's type is private information, but the probability distribution is common knowledge. The monopolist o¤ers a menu, (q i ; p i ) i2fH;Lg ; where q i 2 R + is the product quality and p i 2 R + is the lump sum price for a type-i consumer.
A type-i consumer values a product of quality q i with a concave function u(q i ; i) that satis…es the Inada condition:
The value function also satis…es:
Manufacturing the product of quality q i costs cq i to the seller, where c > 0: The seller's pro…t and the type-i consumer's payo¤ from a transaction are respectively:
on heterogeneous and imperfectly informed consumers from learning their valuation for the good. An intermediate such cost can be optimal in this environment. 7 The Inada condition allows us to rule out the case where the seller excludes the type-L consumers.
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Marketing and Demarketing The seller engages in "marketing ( = m)" to increase the likelihood that a transaction takes place. Marketing is a costly e¤ort for the seller. Instead, the seller can choose "demarketing ( = d)" by transferring the cost of transaction to the consumer. In such a case, without the consumer's transaction e¤ort, a purchase might not be made, as discussed below. However, the consumer may want to make a transaction e¤ort -in such case, she utilizes the product at an extra cost.
We denote by e 2 f0; 1g the e¤ort level of either party, depending on 2 fm; dg: The probability of purchase is given by:
(e) = e + (1 e) ; 2 (0; 1):
With no e¤ort, the probability of transaction is (e = 0) = . When either the seller or the consumer makes the e¤ort, a transaction can take place with probability (e = 1) = 1. We note that > 0; which re ‡ects a possibility of random purchases, is required for demarketing to be optimal. If = 0; a market transaction never takes place without an e¤ort. As will be shown later, the optimal demarketing strategy induces only the type-H consumer to exert a transaction e¤ort, and it becomes equivalent to excluding the type-L consumer. And if = 0; i.e., the seller excludes the type-L consumer with demarketing, marketing can always implement the same outcome from demarketing.
The cost of transaction e¤ort is given by (e) = e for all parties, where > 0: Although both the seller's and the consumer's transaction e¤ort play the same role, their transaction costs may not be the same. Adopting symmetric cost, however, allows us to isolate the strategic e¤ect of demarketing. Our result holds as long as the type-H consumer's cost of e¤ort is not signi…cantly larger than the type-L consumer's.
The situations that we have in mind for our model, in particular, are illustrated in the following bullet points -purchases are probabilistic without a transaction e¤ort, and the type-H and type-L consumer's cost of transaction e¤ort are similar (in our model they are the same for simplicity).
When consumers are boundedly rational, they may not be aware of what products are feasible for purchase even when they know of the existence of products.
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When the seller does not make an e¤ort to make consumers aware of the products, consumers may have to exert a costly (cognitive) e¤ort for her awareness.
For a skill-based product, a costly e¤ort is required to understand product features and functionalities for utilizing the product -either the seller must incur an instruction cost, or the consumer must incur a learning cost.
In both examples above, if the consumer decides not to exert a transaction e¤ort (under demarketing), a transaction may still take place. For example, awareness can come from a third party by chance. Likewise, the consumer may happen to know someone who is well informed of product features and functionalities. Also, in these examples, when the type-H consumer is more knowledgeable or aware of the product, it is likely that she has equal or even lower cost of transaction e¤ort, compared to the type-L consumer.
Timing of the Game We summarize the timing of the game, depending on the seller's choice between marketing and demarketing:
1. The seller chooses 2 fm; dg:
2. The seller makes a transaction e¤ort, and makes it publicly observable. 3. The seller commits to a menu of o¤ers contingent on the consumer's type, (q i ; p i ) i2fH;Lg .
4. A transaction takes place.
2. The seller commits to a menu of o¤ers contingent on the consumer's type, (q i ; p i ) i2fH;Lg .
3. The consumer decides whether or not to make a transaction e¤ort, e 2 f0; 1g:
4. A transaction takes place depending on (e).
Full Information Benchmark
The optimal product quality under full information is the …rst-best. We introduce the following notation.
De…nition 1
The …rst-best outcome is denoted by q i , characterized by:
Under full information, the seller can implement perfect price discrimination:
and leaves no surplus to the consumer of either type.
In the subsequent sections, we show that, when the consumer's type is her private information, demarketing allows the seller to price-discriminate more e¤ectively, and hence can dominate marketing.
9 As will be clear later, we assume that the cost of transaction e¤ort is not prohibitively large that the seller always wants to exert an e¤ort under marketing.
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III. Illustrative Example
We provide a simple example that illustrates our point. Suppose the consumer's value schedule with the product of quality level q is as follows:
High-type Low-type q = 2 : u(2; H) = 4 u(2; L) = 2:5
The consumer's payo¤ is u p; where p is the price. The seller's pro…t is p q; where the cost is given by q: The consumer's type is her private information. The probability that the consumer is high-type is ' H = 1=4 (thus ' L = 3=4); which is common knowledge. The cost of transaction e¤ort is = 1=2: If a transaction e¤ort is made, then the transaction takes place with certainty. If a transaction e¤ort is not made, then the transaction takes place with probability of = 1=2:
Under full information, the optimal outcome is the …rst best and: q H = 2 with p H = 4 (for the high-type consumer, the product quality level is 2 and the price is 4) and q L = 1 with p L = 2 (for the low-type consumer, the product quality level is 1 and the price is 2). Therefore, the consumer surplus of either type is zero, and the seller's expected pro…t is: = Below we present the seller's optimal o¤ers and expected pro…ts with the marketing and the demarketing strategy when the consumer's type is her private information.
Marketing (the seller exerts an e¤ort): In this case, a surplus of u = 1 must be provided to the high-type consumer to keep her from mimicking the low-type. In this simple setting, pooling and separating strategy yield the same pro…t. The seller's pooling strategy is q H = q L = 1 with p H = p L = 2; and his expected pro…t is:
Demarketing (the seller exerts no e¤ort): With demarketing, inducing both types to exert a transaction e¤ort gives the same pro…t as the case with marketing. Suppose the seller induces only the high-type consumer to exert a transaction e¤ort to separate the consumer's types.
To induce the high-type consumer to exert a transaction e¤ort, the seller's o¤er must satisfy:
The LHS of the equation is the high-type consumer's payo¤ when she decides to exert a transaction e¤ort by incurring the cost 1=2: The RHS is her expected payo¤ if she decides to exert no e¤ort -the payo¤ is realized with probability 1=2.
From the equation, since u(2; H) = 4, the seller charges p H = 3 for q H = 2: For the low-type consumer, q L = 1 with p L = 2: The low-type consumer will not exert an e¤ort since she is not compensated for the transaction cost. The high-type consumer's surplus is: 4 3 1=2 = 1=2 (< 1); and she has no incentive to mimic the low-type consumer with or without a transaction The example above illustrates the central trade-o¤ between marketing and demarketing: sales opportunity vs. surplus extraction. The game tree in Figure 1 represents the example.
Place Figure 1 here
IV. Marketing: The Seller Makes a Transaction E¤ort
In this section, we analyze more generally the seller's optimal o¤ers when he engages in marketing
In what follows, we denote by e m the seller's transaction e¤ort. Since the seller does not know the consumer's type when deciding whether or not to exert a transaction e¤ort, the seller's choice of e¤ort level is:
The expression above implies that if the following inequality,
, then the seller exerts full e¤ort, i.e., e m = 1. Throughout this paper, we assume that the transaction cost is not too large so that (1) is always satis…ed.
Provided that (1) holds, the seller's problem is the standard non-linear pricing that screens the consumer's type. With = m; the seller solves the following problem:
The …rst constraints, (3), are the participation constraints for the consumer, and the second constraints, (4), assures that the consumer's payo¤ is higher when she truthfully represents her type.
The following proposition presents the seller's optimal o¤er when the seller makes a transaction e¤ort.
Proposition 1 With marketing, the seller's optimal o¤ ers are characterized as follows:
The result above is standard. The product quality for a type-H consumer is at the …rst best level, known as "e¢ ciency at the top" in the literature, but the product quality for a type-L consumer is distorted downwards. In models of this type, the type-H consumer has an incentive to mimic the type-L consumer to reap an information rent of u (q L ):
The seller discourages such a mimicry by distorting the product quality for the type-L consumer downwards. As a result, the seller must reduce both p H and p L from the …rst best levels (p H < p H and p L < p L ), resulting in imperfect price discrimination.
V. Demarketing: The Consumer Makes a Transaction E¤ort
We now proceed to the case where the seller engages in demarketing. In this case, the seller's choice of price and quality can a¤ect the consumer's incentive to make a transaction e¤ort. The key di¤erence from the case in the previous section is the fact that, when the demarketing strategy is chosen, the seller can induce only a particular type of consumer to make a transaction e¤ort.
In other words, the seller can manipulate o¤ers in a way that one type of consumer purchases the product by making a transaction e¤ort, while the other type may purchase the product only by chance without a transaction e¤ort.
Before we proceed, we …rst establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If the seller prefers demarketing to marketing, then the seller induces only the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ ort.
It is not di¢ cult to see that inducing both the type-H and the type-L consumer to make a transaction e¤ort simply makes it more costly to the seller, compared to the case in which the seller makes a transaction e¤ort. Since the type-L consumer gets zero consumer surplus from a purchase, she has no incentive to make a transaction e¤ort. Therefore, to incentivize the type-L consumer, the seller must provide her with a strictly positive consumer surplus. Such a surplus to the type-L consumer, however, makes the type-H consumer misrepresent her type. As a result, the seller must provide the additional surplus to both the type-H and the type-L consumer.
Similarly, it is suboptimal for the seller to induce only the type-L consumer to make a transaction e¤ort. To do so, the seller must compensate the type-L consumer's e¤ort by decreasing p L ; which encourages the type-H consumer to misrepresent her type as the type-L consumer. Again, the seller will simply end up providing more consumer surplus under this arrangement.
Another possibility is that the seller induces neither type to make a transaction e¤ort. This case, however, is no di¤erent from when the seller chooses the marketing strategy without making an e¤ort. This is the case when is so large that (1) does not hold -marketing and demarketing become e¤ectively the same. To di¤erentiate the two strategies, we assume that is not too large.
In what follows, we denote by e d i a type-i consumer's transaction e¤ort. The type-i consumer's problem when deciding whether to make a transaction e¤ort is:
To induce e d H = 1; the seller's optimal o¤er for the type-H consumer must satisfy:
On the other hand, the seller wants to ensure that the type-L consumer prefers not to make a transaction e¤ort, i.e., e d L = 0:
Since consumer surplus must be non-negative, the seller's maximization problem must satisfy the following participation constraints for the consumer:
Finally, as the revelation principle applies in our model, the seller's o¤er must satisfy the incentive constraints for the consumer's truthful behavior:
The constraints above assure that the consumer's payo¤ from truthfully representing her type (the left hand sides) is higher than her payo¤ from misrepresentation (the right hand sides). The right hand sides of (10) and (11) exhibit the consumer's choice of whether or not to make a transaction e¤ort if she decides to misrepresent her type.
When inducing only the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ort, the seller's problem is as follows:
subject to (6); (7); (8); (9); (10) and (11): Notice that (6) implies (8):
We distinguish three regimes for the optimal outcome when the seller engages in demarketing and only the type-H consumer makes a transaction e¤ort. To characterize the optimal outcomes in each regime, we …rst present the following cuto¤ levels of the transaction cost.
The following proposition characterizes the seller's optimal o¤ers with a demarketing strategy in which only the type-H consumer is induced to make a transaction e¤ort.
Proposition 2 With demarketing, the seller's optimal o¤ ers with e H = 1 and e L = 0 are characterized as follows:
When the transaction cost is su¢ ciently small, i.e., < ; the type-H consumer's information rent u (q L ) is large enough that the seller does not need to compensate her for a transaction e¤ort, and consequently, p In this regime ( < ); as the transaction cost increases, although demarketing allows the seller to recover the distortion in q L by extracting the type-H consumer's information, the seller still cannot completely restore the …rst-best quality level.
As the transaction cost increases further, i.e., 2 [ ; ]; while it becomes more costly to induce the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ort, her private information becomes less of a problem.
Within this intermediate range, the seller's extra discount for the type-H consumer to induce her e¤ort is large enough that the type-H consumer no longer has an incentive to misrepresent her type as type-L: In other words, "countervailing incentives" arise in this range of the transaction cost -the type-H consumer's incentive to acquire information rent is mitigated by her incentive to be compensated for her transaction e¤ort. Consequently, the seller does not need to distort the product qualities in his optimal o¤er to extract the consumer's surplus linked to her private
In this range of the transaction cost, although the seller must give the type-H consumer a discount for her e¤ort, the seller's price discrimination is e¢ cient.
As the transaction cost becomes yet larger, i.e., > , the discount to the type-H consumer leads to the "reverse incentive" problem. In this regime, the type-H consumer has no misrepresenting incentive, but the type-L consumer has such an incentive when she purchases the product by chance.
To discourage the type-L consumer from mimicking type-H consumer, the seller must increase p H ; but this will discourage the type-H consumer's transaction e¤ort. As a result, the seller must increase the product quality for the type-H consumer from the …rst-best level (q
10 In addition to increasing p H ; the seller also gives the type-L consumer a discount to prevent mimicry.
As a result, the price for the type-L consumer becomes lower compared to the case with
In summary, unlike the marketing strategy, the demarketing strategy brings about di¤erent incentive problems according to the size of the transaction cost. In the next section, we examine pros and cons of each strategy, and endogenize the seller's choice of 2 fm; dg.
VI. Choice between Marketing and Demarketing
By incurring the transaction cost directly ( = m); the seller can sell his product with certaintythe transaction will always take place. However, the seller then makes an e¤ort regardless of the consumer's type. Moreover, with the marketing strategy, the seller must always provide type-H consumer with strictly positive information rent.
The demarketing strategy ( = d) brings more ‡exibility, allowing the seller to induce the consumer's transaction e¤ort depending on the consumer's type (only the type-H consumer in the optimum). Such ‡exibility allows the seller to partially save the transaction cost, but more importantly, it has a strategic bene…t. In particular, when the e¤ort cost is neither too small nor too large, the demarketing strategy creates the consumer's "countervailing incentives" -the type-H consumer's incentive to mimic the type-L consumer in order to command information rent is alleviated since she is compensated for her transaction e¤ort only when she chooses the bundle of fq H ; p H g. That is, the demarketing strategy enables the seller to extract the consumer's information rent more e¤ectively.
From Proposition 1, we obtain the seller's expected pro…t m ( ), whereas Proposition 2 char- 
When < l , the seller chooses marketing.
When 2 [ l ; h ], the seller chooses demarketing.
1 0 The outcome under the reverse incentive problem may explain the excessive qualities of some products and services -e.g., there are exceptionally …ne restaurants that limit the number of seats. See Kotler and Levy [1971] for more examples.
When > h , the seller chooses marketing.
For a small transaction cost, the compensation to the type-H consumer for making a transaction e¤ort with demarketing is also small -the compensation for the type-H consumer's e¤ort is not attractive enough for her to give up taking advantage of her private information. The seller with the demarketing strategy, therefore, still has to provide signi…cant information rent to induce the consumer's truthful behavior. With the marketing strategy, although information rent needs to be provided to the type-H consumer, the seller can have a higher probability of transaction at a low cost. When the transaction cost is small, the bene…t from marketing outweighs the bene…t from demarketing.
When the transaction cost is not so small, the marketing strategy becomes less attractive to the seller, while the demarketing strategy becomes more attractive. Despite the lower chance of transaction, demarketing enables the seller to extract the consumer's information rent when the transaction cost is intermediate, leading to more e¢ cient price discrimination. This e¤ect dominates when the di¤erence in the consumer's valuations is large enough, and consequently, the seller prefers the demarketing strategy.
When the transaction cost is large, however, the strategic merit in the demarketing strategy vanishes since it brings about the reverse incentive problem. Under the reverse incentive problem, the same compensation for transaction e¤ort given to the type-H consumer must also be provided to the type-L consumer. It becomes too costly to induce the consumer's transaction e¤ort, and the seller again prefers the marketing strategy.
An interesting question is how a change in a¤ects the seller's optimal strategy. Recall that an increase in implies that the transaction e¤ort becomes less important. We …nd that as rises, the parameter range for demarketing to be optimal becomes greater. The seller's expected pro…t with marketing m remains the same, whereas that with demarketing d is increasing in . Applying the envelope theorem to (12), we obtain:
which leads to the following Corollary immediately.
Corollary 1
The intuition is straightforward. Demarketing reduces a market transaction with the type-L consumers by probability 1 : This cost of demarketing becomes smaller in . This result, however, has to be carefully understood. When is su¢ ciently large and, for example, close to 1, the seller may decide neither to make an e¤ort himself nor to induce it from the consumer. That is, when (1) does not hold, marketing is no di¤erent than demarketing. Thus, the result that demarketing becomes more attractive as rises is valid under the assumption that (1) holds, i.e., when is not prohibitively large.
14 As mentioned before, the transaction costs may not be the same for the two types. Suppose (H) > (L); i.e., the type-H consumer's cost is higher than the type-L consumer's, as in models of price discrimination through coupons. If the gap between (H) and (L) is small enough, then demarketing by inducing only the type-H consumer to exerts a transaction e¤ort is still optimal. If (H) < (L), then it reinforces our result since it is relatively cheaper to induce the type-H consumer to exert an e¤ort. In general, as (H) becomes smaller relative to (L); demarketing becomes more attractive to the seller. While some previous studies, such as those with price discrimination using coupons, show that it is optimal to induce only the type-L consumer to incur the transaction cost for (H) > (L), our study suggests that if the gap is not signi…cant, or (H) (L), it can be optimal to induce only the type-H consumer to induce the transaction cost.
VII. Extensions
In this section, we extend our analysis in two directions. First, we allow the possibility of joint transaction e¤ort made both by the seller and the consumer. Second, we look at a case in which the seller o¤ers the menu for a type-H consumer only through an exclusive sales channel for which the consumer's transaction e¤ort is required.
VII(i). Possibility of Sharing a Transaction E¤ort
Thus far, we have considered that the transaction cost is incurred by either the seller or the consumer.
We now investigate the case where the seller can share the transaction cost with the consumer. The seller chooses three e¤ort levels, e m ; e 1; i 2 fH; Lg in the optimum. Otherwise, there will be a wasted e¤ort.
In our framework, therefore, the likelihood of transaction, (e); becomes:
(e m + e To induce type-L consumer to make an e¤ort higher than the type-H consumer, the seller's compensation to the type-L consumer encourages the type-H consumer to misrepresent her type as type-L. As a result, the seller must provide the additional rent to the type-H consumer as well as the type-L consumer.
The discussion above implies that, in the optimum: (14) and (13) imply:
Notice that, with e m = 1, then (15) and (16) become identities -if only the seller exerts a transaction e¤ort, then the consumer's incentive for an e¤ort becomes irrelevant.
Proposition 4 With demarketing, suppose the seller can share a fraction of the consumer's transaction e¤ ort. If ' L is small enough, the seller will not exert any transaction e¤ ort.
As in Proposition 3, demarketing is optimal when
H L is large enough, but even if the seller can share the consumer's transaction e¤ort, he would not do so if the consumer is unlikely to be type-L: Recall that demarketing allows the seller to save the cost of transaction e¤ort, depending on the consumer's type. When there is no need to let the consumer exert the entire transaction e¤ort with demarketing, the seller may also exert some e¤ort -because e d L = 0 in the demarketing strategy, if the consumer is likely to be type-L; exerting e m > 0 allows the seller to recover some potential sales loss from type-L consumer. If the consumer is unlikely to be type-L; however, the seller will exert no e¤ort to save the cost of transaction e¤ort.
VII(ii). Possibility of Exclusive Channel Strategy
So far, we have assumed that the seller always o¤ers the full menu, fq H ; p H : q L ; p L g. O¤ering the full menu is optimal when the seller employs the marketing strategy ( = m). When employing the demarketing strategy ( = d); however, the seller may have more room to manipulate the availability of the menu, depending on the consumer's transaction e¤ort. In this section, we distinguish two di¤erent strategies under demarketing. The …rst one is the demarketing strategy which has already been discussed -o¤ering full menu, fq H ; p H : q L ; p L g, regardless of the consumer's transaction e¤ort.
The second one is the strategy that makes fq H ; p H g available only for the consumer who makes a transaction e¤ort (e d = 1); while making fq L ; p L g available for the consumer regardless of the consumer's e¤ort. For example, the seller can set up di¤erent purchasing channels for the consumer:
the "exclusive channel" through which fq H ; p H g is o¤ered only for the consumer who makes an e¤ort to access the exclusive channel. This can be thought of as special discounts or deals for which consumers must incur a transaction e¤ort. For example, some companies o¤er certain products for sale only online and do not make them available in their retail stores, and vice versa. Some fast food and co¤ee franchises, such as In-N-Out, McDonald's and Starbucks, o¤er fancier menus through less known channels. 11 These "exclusive sales channels" are available only to the consumers who make an e¤ort to acquire information. Another example is when some retailers o¤er special deals or sales through e-mails only when consumers incur a "hassle"cost, such as submitting a long survey. 12 We refer this to "the exclusive channel strategy ( = e d)."
We assume that, with the exclusive channel strategy, the full menu fq H ; p H : q L ; p L g is available only through an exclusive sales channel so that without making a transaction e¤ort, the consumer cannot have an access to fq H ; p H g -only fq L ; p L g is available to the consumer if she makes no transaction e¤ort. Figure 2 illustrates the di¤erence among marketing ( = m), demarketing ( = d) and exclusive channel strategy ( = e d).
Place Figure 2 here
The di¤erence between the two strategies is clear from the …gure. Unlike the demarketing strategy, the exclusive channel strategy does not physically allow the type-L consumer to mimic the type-H consumer without making a transaction e¤ort. This leads to two changes. First, if the type-H consumer decides not to make a transaction e¤ort, only the low-quality product is available for her (as before, the chance that she …nds the product is in such a case). Therefore, the condition for the type-H consumer's transaction e¤ort becomes:
Second, the type-L consumer must incur the transaction cost if she decides to mimic type-H:
Therefore, instead of (11) in the demarketing strategy, the seller must satisfy the following incentive constraint for the type-L consumer's truthful behavior:
The seller maximizes his expected payo¤ in (12); subject to (8); (9); (17); (10) and (18): To characterize the optimal outcomes in each regime, we …rst present the following cuto¤ levels of the transaction cost. When is small enough, the e¤ect is similar to the demarketing strategy. The type-H consumer's information rent is large enough relative to that the seller does not need to compensate her for her transaction e¤ort, which leads to e p As becomes larger, the seller must incentivize the type-H consumer to make a transaction e¤ort by providing a discount. However, the e¤ect of the exclusive channel strategy becomes di¤erent from that of the demarketing strategy. First, under the demarketing strategy, the type-H consumer can truthfully reveal her type regardless of her transaction e¤ort. Under the exclusive channel strategy, however, if the type-H consumer decides not to make a transaction e¤ort, she cannot reveal her true type (only the price-quality bundle for the type-L consumer is o¤ered through the regular channel).
Second, recall that, under the demarketing strategy when is large, the type-L consumer has an incentive to mimic the type-H consumer (without making a transaction e¤ort). This, however, is not the case under the exclusive channel strategy. The type-L consumer must incur the transaction cost to mimic type-H: These two e¤ects together, when e ; make the product quality levels identical to those in the case of marketing (e q We now compare the three strategies that we have discussed to demonstrate the robustness of the demarketing strategy. As shown below, demarketing strategy blended with special deals through exclusive channels can dominate the marketing strategy. The next proposition presents the seller's optimal choice when the exclusive channel strategy is available.
Proposition 6 Suppose
H L is large enough. Then, there exists e h < h such that
When 2 [ l ; e h ], the seller chooses demarketing.
When > e h , the seller chooses demarketing with exclusive channels.
With the exclusive channel strategy, the type-L consumer's incentive to mimic type-H is not an issue since the high-quality product is available only through the exclusive channel. This has both a negative and a positive e¤ect. The negative e¤ect is that the consumer's "countervailing incentives" under the demarketing strategy vanishes under the exclusive channel strategy. As mentioned above, the exclusive channel strategy does not allow the type-H consumer to reveal her true type without making a transaction e¤ort. As a result, with the exclusive channel strategy, the seller cannot achieve the …rst-best product qualities for both types when the transaction cost is intermediate.
The positive side is that the exclusive channel strategy eliminates the "reverse incentive" when the transaction cost is large. For large transaction costs, therefore, the exclusive channel strategy allows the seller to avoid giving a discount to the type-L consumer without an upward distortion in q H .
In summary, for intermediate transaction costs, the demarketing strategy generates countervailing incentives, which enables the seller to price-discriminate more e¤ectively by extracting the consumer's information rent. For large transaction costs, the exclusive channel strategy dominates the demarketing strategy because the seller e¤ectively price-discriminates with respect to the consumer's transaction e¤ort, which cannot be implemented with the full menu strategy. Finally, the exclusive channel strategy dominates the marketing strategy because the seller can save the e¤ort cost for the type-L consumer without having the reverse incentive problem. The result is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Place Figure 3 here Before we close this section, we discuss the possibility of di¤erent types of strategies. For example, one may ask if it can be optimal to o¤er fq L ; p L g only in the exclusive channel, while o¤ering fq H ; p H : q L ; p L g in the regular channel. That is, the seller has to induce the type-L consumer to make an e¤ort for purchase fq L ; p L g: In this case, the seller can induce a transaction e¤ort either from both types, or only from the type-L consumer. However, as shown in Lemma 1, this case cannot dominate the marketing strategy.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a seller can employ demarketing as an instrument for price discrimination. We have de…ned marketing as the seller making an e¤ort to increase the likelihood of a transaction, and demarketing as the seller not making such e¤ort. Our result suggests that, when a consumer's preference is private information, demarketing can dominate marketing. We have shown that in the optimal demarketing strategy, the seller induces the high-valuation consumers to exert an e¤ort for transaction, without inducing the low-valuation consumers to do so. This strategy allows the seller to be able to extract the consumer's surplus more e¤ectively. According to our results, when the transaction cost is small or large, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing.
For intermediate transaction costs, by contrast, the seller may prefer demarketing. We have also shown that, with exclusive sales channels, demarketing can be the optimal strategy even for large transaction costs.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Since does not play any role, only (4) for the type-H consumer and (3) for the type-L consumer are binding as in a standard screening problem:
Substituting for p H and p L in the objective function in (2); we solve:
The …rst-order conditions give:
Proof of Lemma 1.
We show that, with = d; (i) the case in which the seller induces a transaction e¤ort from the consumer regardless of her type and (ii) the case in which the seller only induces the type-L consumer's transaction e¤ort are both dominated by the seller's optimal outcome with = m: First, suppose, with = d, the seller induces a transaction e¤ort from both types. Then, the following constraint must be satis…ed:
which can be rewritten as:
The consumer's participation constraint u(q i ; i) p i 0 is implied by (21) regardless of her type. The constraints that induce the consumer's truthful representation of her type are:
The RHS of (22) exhibits the consumer's choice of whether or not to exert a transaction e¤ort if she decides to misrepresent her type (o¤ the equilibrium path). To simplify (22); we …rst make the following claim.
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Claim 4 Suppose (21) holds. Then, the inequality below must hold if (22) for a type-i consumer is binding:
Proof. Suppose u(q j ; i) p j < 1 ; which implies that u(q j ; i) p j < [u(q j ; i) p j ] in the RHS of (22): Then, binding (22) for a type-i consumer can be rewritten as:
which is a contradiction since the LHS of the equation is positive by (21), but the RHS is negative.
Claim 1 implies that RHS of (22) is u(q j ; i) p j : Therefore, (22) becomes the same as (4) in the case with = m, since cancels out with each other in both sides of (22). The seller's problem then is written as:
Compared to the case with = m, there are two di¤erences. First, the transaction cost is transferred to the consumer, and second, the consumer's reservation payo¤ is 1 : As usual, (23) for type-L and (24) for the type-H consumer are binding at the optimum, and we have expression for p i ; i 2 fH; Lg; from these binding constraints. After substituting for the prices in the seller's objective function, the optimization problem becomes:
Directly comparing (25) to (20) shows that the seller's pro…t with = d is strictly lower than his pro…t with = m:
Next, suppose, with = d, the seller induces a transaction e¤ort only from the type-L consumer.
Then, the following constraint must be satis…ed:
The constraints that induce the consumer's truthful representation of her type are:
Claim 5 Suppose u(q H ; H) p H < 1 . Then, the inequality below must hold:
in the RHS of (27): Then, (27) with a simple manipulation gives:
which is a contradiction since the LHS is negative, but the RHS is positive.
Claim 2 implies that the RHS of (27) (27) and (28) become the same as (4) in the case with = m:
For type-L consumer, (26) implies that the constraint for
is automatically satis…ed. By Claim 2, (27) is written as u(
implies that the participation constraint for the type-H consumer u(q H ; H) p H 0 is automatically satis…ed. Therefore, the seller's problem is written as:
Again, by Claim 1 and 2, (27) and (28) become the constraints in (30): It can be easily shown that (29) and (30) for the type-H are binding, and (30) for the type-L consumer is slack. By substituting for p L and p H in the objective function, the seller's problem becomes:
Clearly, the seller's pro…t in (31) is even smaller than it's pro…t in (25).
Proof of Proposition 2.
We …rst establish the following two claims.
Claim 6 Suppose (6) holds. Then, the inequality below must hold if (10) is binding:
in the RHS of (10) Then, binding (10) can be rewritten as:
which is a contradiction since the LHS is positive by (6), but the RHS is negative.
The Claim above implies that RHS of (10) is u(q L ; H) p L : Therefore, (10) can be rewritten
Then, the inequality below must hold:
in the RHS of (11). Then, (11) with a simple manipulation gives:
The Claim above implies that RHS of (11) 
It can be easily shown that (7) is automatically satis…ed by the solution without it in our problem.
Also, (6) implies (8), and by Claims 3 and 4, the incentive compatibility constraints (10) and (11) can be rewritten respectively as:
Thus, the Lagrangian of the seller's problem can be written as:
In the optimum:
As will be shown below, the …rst regime, < is divided into two sub-regimes, < and 2 [ ; ); and > is also divided into two sub-regimes, 2 ( ; ] and > : The following two
Claims establish the binding constraints in each case.
Claim 8 3 4 = 0, i.e., (10) and (11) cannot be simultaneously binding.
Proof. Suppose 3 > 0 and 4 > 0. Then, from (32) and (33), 3 = ' H 1 + 4 and 4 = ' L 2 + 3 : Also, from (34) and (35)
; which is not possible. Proof. Suppose 4 = 2 = 0: (35) gives 3 < 0; which is a contradiction. From (32) and (34) with 4 = 0; we obtain u q (q H ; H) = c; and thus q d H = q H : Similarly, 3 = 1 = 0 yields 4 < 0 in (34), which is a contradiction. Also, (33) and (35) with 3 = 0; we obtain u q (q L ; L) = c; and thus
By Claim 5 and 6, we can con…ne our attention to the …ve cases below. Case I, in which 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0 ((9) and (10) are binding), Case II, in which 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0 ((6); (9) and (10) are binding), Case III, in which 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 = 0 ((6) and (9) are binding); Case IV, in which 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0 ((6); (9) and (11) are binding); and Case V, in which 1 > 0; 2 = 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0 ( (6) and (11) are binding). We show that Case I and II belong to the regime of < , Case III to the regime of 2 [ ; ); and Case IV and V to the regime of > : We denote
; and (42)
Case I: 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0:
Suppose is close to zero. Then, the problem becomes a standard screening problem in which only (10) and (9) are binding. From (32) and (34) with 4 = 0, we have u q (q H ; H) = c; and thus
The non-binding constraint associated with 1 is written as:
As increases, the constraint will eventually be binding at = ; where = (1 )u (q L ):
Case II: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0 and 4 = 0: As becomes ; the constraint linked to 1 ; (6);
begins to bind as well. In this case, the binding (36), (37), and (38) give: 
The non-binding constraint related with 4 ; (11); is written as:
As becomes larger, this constraint will bind at = ; where = (1 )u (q H ):
Case IV: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0: As > ; we consider the case where the constraint linked to 4 ; (11); begins to bind. Note that q d H is no longer q H because of 4 > 0: Binding (36), (37), and (39) give:
decreases and eventually the constraint linked to 2 becomes no longer binding at = ; where
Case V: 1 > 0; 2 = 0; 3 = 0 and 4 > 0:
Solving (32) and (33) together with 2 = 3 = 0, (34) is rewritten as:
It follows that Case I and II belong to the regime of < , Case III to the regime of 2 [ ; );
and Case IV and V to the regime of > :
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Proposition 1, the seller's expected pro…t with = m is:
Also, by Proposition 2, the seller's expected pro…t with = C is:
Claim 10 C is non-increasing and weakly concave in .
Proof. Applying the envelope theorem to the Lagrangian, we have
Let us …nd 1 ( ). From (32), 1 = ' H 3 + 4 : Solving (33) and (35) (32) and (34), we obtain 4 = max
It is immediate that
; and > ; because q H ; q H ; q L ; and q L is independent of . In other words, in these three regimes, C is linearly decreasing. However, when 2 [ ; ) or 2 ( ; ]; we have to investigate the sign of
Thus, a simple calculation gives 
Then, we have:
The …rst two terms are positive, whereas the last two terms are negative. Given L, as H increases (hence increases), both u (q L ) and u (q 
Proof of Proposition 4.
With the possibility of sharing the transaction e¤ort with the consumer, the participation constraints and incentive constraints are written accordingly as:
Thus, the seller solves the following problem:
subject to (15); (16); (44); (45); (46) and (47):
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The structure of the problem is the same as the seller's problem with = d where the type-H consumer exerts an e¤ort of e = 1 (Proof of Proposition 2). As in Proof of Proposition 2, there are multiple cases here, depending on the parameters. We focus on the case where is large enough that (15) and (45) are the binding constraints, instead of (46) and (45) (15) and (45); the Lagrangian of the seller's problem can be written as:
The …rst order conditions are:
Notice …rst that, if e m = 1; then we have a contradiction in (48) -with the marketing strategy (only the seller exerts the transaction e¤ort), as shown in Proposition 1, (15) becomes irrelevant since no e¤ort from the consumer needs to be induced. That is, is large enough that @L=@e m cannot be strictly positive in this regime, and e m < 1: Then, e m + (1 e m ) 2 (0; 1); and it is implied from (48) that 1 > 0: Therefore, (15) is binding and:
If e m = 1; then this, after a simple manipulation, becomes:
Also, from (49); 2 = ' L > 0; and therefore (45) is binding and:
Replacing p H and p L with their values in the objective function and optimizing in q H and q L , we have:
Using (52) and (53); we can replace the consumer surplus with their values in (50): We then have:
Again, in this regime, is large enough that the week inequality in (54) holds. Therefore, if ' L is small enough, the inequality in (54) is strictly satis…ed and e m = 0:
When e m = 0 (' L is small enough), the optimal outcome is exactly the same as the one in Case III in Proof of Proposition 2, and so is the cuto¤ , i.e., the outcome here is optimal for 2 [ ; ];
Showing that demarketing is optimal is the same as in Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 5.
First, (8) is implied by (17) and (9):
Thus, (8) 
These two inequalities imply that the latter is always satis…ed because u (q H ) > u (q L ) regardless of (17): Since (8) and (18) are non-binding, the Lagrangian of the seller's problem can be written as:
The …rst order conditions are: As will be shown below, the …rst regime, < e ; is divided into two sub-regimes: < and 2 [ ; e ):
Case I: 1 = 0; 2 > 0; and 3 > 0: Suppose is small enough. Then, the problem is reduced to a standard problem. We obtain e q Case III: 1 > 0; 2 > 0; and 3 = 0: Next, when > e ; only (17) and (9) are binding. Substituting (17) and (9) into the seller's objective function, we obtain
The …rst order conditions give e q Proof of Proposition 6.
By proposition 4, the seller's expected pro…t with = e d is: 
Thus, the seller's choice of = e d generates a higher pro…t when is su¢ ciently large. 
